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THROUGH A DIFFERENT LENS: A REPLY 
TO STEPHAN THERNSTROM 
Linda F. Wightman* 
In a continuation of the debate over the role of preferential 
admissions in higher education, Professor Stephan Thernstrom 
prepared an evaluation of my study The Threat to Diversity in 
Legal Education: An Empirical Analysis of the Consequences of 
Abandoning Race as a Factor in Law School Admission Deci-
sions.1 He purports to set forth three broad critiques of the 
study: (1) the analysis is "badly flawed," (2) key questions that 
could have and should have been asked never were asked, and 
(3) the evidence runs directly counter to the conclusions. I ad-
dress his critique first generally and then more technically, to 
show that his conclusions represent neither the intent nor the 
substance of my study. 
I. 
First, my study examines the consequences of abandoning 
race as a factor in admission to law school and analyzes the suc-
cess of minority students in their quest to enter the legal profes-
sion. My study presents to Professor Thernstrom a glass that is 
three-quarters full, but he criticizes it for not trumpeting that the 
glass is one-quarter empty. In his review, he mischaracterizes 
important aspects of the purpose, design, and conclusions of my 
study, and then criticizes the study based on those mischarac-
terizations. 
Second, Professor Thernstrom utilizes provocative language 
to make a strong political statement as a response to my techni-
cal analyses. He decries "inferior academic qualification[]" of 
students who received "racial preferences in admissions" under 
* Associate Professor, Department of Educational Research Methodology, 
School of Education at The University of North Carolina at Greensboro. I am deeply 
indebted to Professor Charles Daye for his numerous insightful comments and valuable 
suggestions and edits. 
1. 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (Apr. 1997). 
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affirmative action "double standards. "2 Yet, nowhere does he set 
forth what his criteria are for second-guessing the judgments of 
many law schools' own academic standards. In referring to the 
students for whom race was a factor in their admission as having 
had "intellectual handicaps, "3 Professor Thernstrom incorrectly 
implies that I have claimed that their "initial handicaps appar-
ently vanished. "4 On the one hand, he never supports his asser-
tion that students were "handicapped"; while on the other hand, 
he discounts the value-added efforts the students and law 
schools performed that may have compensated for the students' 
earlier under-preparation. 
Third, Professor Thernstrom introduces an implicit "divide 
and conquer" strategy to his agenda by suggesting that the elite 
law schools gave a greater boost to blacks than to other minority 
groups.5 Continuing with that line of attack, he asserts that 
"African American applicants to law school receive much 
heavier preferences than members of any other racial or ethnic 
minority." 6 He further contends that preferences were stronger 
in the "top three tiers" than "down in the very unselective and 
undistinguished fifth-tier law schools."7 My study did not make 
those kinds of judgments about law schools and it is not obvious 
what policy objective would make such statements relevant. 
Fourth, Professor Thernstrom presents a global indictment 
of the ability of law schools and states conducting bar examina-
tions to do their jobs when he denounces both law school 
graduation rates and bar examination passage rates as 
"indefensibly crude dichotomous measures of achievement. "8 
He says that since most law students graduate, one could not 
expect law school graduation "to be a strong discriminator."9 
What he apparently fails to understand is that law schools are in 
the business of training lawyers and legal scholars, not simply in 
the business of ranking the law students they admit.10 Moreover, 
2. Stephan Themstrom, Diversity and Meritocracy in Legal Education: A Critical 
Evaluation of Linda F. Wightman's "The Threat to Diversity in Legal Education," 15 
Const. Comm. 11, 12 (1998). 
3. ld. at 42. 
4. Id. at 13. 
5. ld. at 16-19. 
6. Id. at 16. 
7. Id. at 17. 
8. Id. at 27. He also says that graduating from law school is no great achieve-
ment. ld. at 30. 
9. ld. at 28. 
10. Some law schools have abandoned assigning letter or number grades to law 
students specifically to avoid this phenomenon. 
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Professor Thernstrom's arguments fail to acknowledge that so 
long as letter or number grades are assigned to law students, re-
gardless of their academic preparation prior to law school one 
fourth of the successful students would still graduate in the bot-
tom quartile of their class. His discussion does not reveal 
whether he would similarly discount graduation as a measure of 
qualification if only white students were in the graduating class. 
When the issue is whether students admitted to law school were 
qualified to enter law school, a measure that examines whether 
they completed law school cannot be so easily dismissed as a 
"methodological flaw." Similarly, no amount of criticism or re-
analysis can discount passing the bar exam as a measure of one's 
qualification to enter the legal profession. 
Finally, and most importantly, Professor Thernstrom's cri-
tique is virtually devoid of any apparent concern about the con-
sequences his perspective would portend for our nation, for the 
legal profession, or for the depth and quality of law students' 
educational experiences. He purports to express concern for the 
one quarter of the black students who were admitted to law 
school but who, for a variety of reasons, did not succeed in en-
tering the profession. He shows no apparent concern about the 
three-quarters of those students who would never have had an 
opportunity to go to law school under the perspective he pres-
ents but who, nevertheless, with the benefit of affirmative ac-
tion, are now members of the legal profession. 
II. WHAT IS AT THE CORE OF DIFFERENT VIEWS OF 
THE SAME DATA? 
Although not immediately apparent from the language and 
style of Professor Thernstrom's evaluation of my study, his disa-
greements with it turn more on its implications than on the 
study itself. He criticizes the models, but concedes that their 
predictions of the impact of eliminating race as a factor in law 
school admissions are likely correct. 11 He criticizes the use and 
interpretation of law school graduation and bar examination 
data, but concedes that "just about every student passed the bar 
eventually." 12 In contrast, he devotes considerable attention to 
emphasizing the differences between black and white law stu-
dent data, regardless of the predicted admission decision for 
those students, and criticizes my analyses for not doing the 
11. Themstrom, 15 Const. Comm. at 16 (cited in note 2). 
12. Id. at 34. 
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same. It is here that he and I part ways and view the purpose 
and value of diversity in education through very different lenses. 
The consequences of adopting an admission model such as the 
one he suggests, with a goal toward minimizing the difference in 
academic performance between black and white students, is not 
good for legal education, is not good for students, and is disin-
genuous in its goals. 
We live in a multicultural society, and demographic trends 
confirm that it will only become more so in the future. That so-
ciety offers challenges and opportunities not only to legal educa-
tion but also to all of higher education. Legal educators are 
among those most responsible for training leaders of the future. 
Thus, achieving academic excellence is not only a goal but a re-
sponsibility of legal education. Academic excellence must mean 
more than filling classrooms with students who earn high scores 
on standardized achievement tests. High scoring students bring 
something of value to the classroom. In the case of the LSAT, 
high scores identify students who have acquired high levels of 
reading and reasoning skills. But that is only one of the factors 
that contribute to excellence in education. Learning requires 
stimulating classes; stimulating classes require diversity of expe-
rience and perception. Diversity of that kind challenges assump-
tions and questions the status quo. Students learn from each 
other as much or more than they learn from their instructors. 
Their learning opportunity is so much broader when they do not 
all speak with the same voice! Students leave the classroom to 
serve, work with, and work within a society diverse in its needs 
and demands. Education is not excellent if it falls short of pre-
paring students to enter and contribute to that world. The goal 
of legal education is not to graduate fungible commodities; it 
seeks leaders who can make a difference. Some of those leaders 
will be from the majority culture-leaders who will be limited in 
their potential to make a difference if they are denied exposure 
to and challenges from those who think and believe and experi-
ence differently. Other leaders will and must come from the 
multiple cultures that are represented in our society. The real 
challenges are (1) how to define those factors that taken to-
gether optimize excellent education and (2) how to identify 
those factors in law school applicants. We cannot make progress 
in meeting those challenges until we get beyond the belief that 
test scores and grades are the only acceptable measures of merit. 
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A. THE MODELS AND ANALYSES 
Although Professor Themstrom uses provocative lan-
guage-such as "unfortunately, the author's analysis is badly 
flawed" and "the author glosses over serious methodological 
problems with both models," -he identified neither flaws in the 
analysis nor problems with the methodology. Rather, he takes 
issue with the reality that the models do not completely reflect 
all the factors traditionally considered in the admission process. 
I do not disagree with the assessment about what is not included 
in the models, but a conclusion of flawed analysis or serious 
methodological problems does not follow from that assessment. 
The models based on LSAT score and undergraduate grade 
point average (UGPA) are neither intended to be nor were they 
represented in my study to be anything more than statistical 
tools to model a complex human process so that we can attempt 
to answer questions about potential changes in that process. 
The article includes a careful explanation that 
[t]he statistical models used in this study do not suggest that 
law schools rely exclusively and solely on LSA T scores and 
UGPAs (or a combination of these measures) in admitting ei-
ther white students or students of color. In fact, ... the results 
demonstrate that in the admission of law students, law schools 
do consider factors that are not numeric and that, therefore, 
cannot be accounted for by the models developed for this 
study. The purpose of the models is to evaluate differences in 
admission practices between and among applicants from se-
lected ethnic groups, as well as to estimate the impact of dis-
continuing consideration of the race of applicants on admis-
sion decision outcomes.13 
The analyses were undertaken to determine whether appli-
cants with similar application credentials had a differential 
probability of gaining acceptance to law school if they were 
nonwhite than if they were white. If the probabilities were es-
sentially identical, we could conclude that race was playing little 
or no role in the admission process and that color-blind admis-
sions would have no predictable impact on diversity in higher 
education. In fact, the results demonstrated a significantly 
higher probability of admission for applicants of color. These re-
sults do not imply that race is the only other factor taken into 
consideration; they do suggest that law schools use different fac-
tors in reaching admission decisions for applicants of color than 
13. Wightman, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 5-6 n.12 (cited in note 1). 
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for white applicants. In particular, LSAT scores and UGPA 
carry less weight for applicants of color than for white appli-
cants. The validity and utility of the results do not require that 
the models be perfect predictors. Models seldom, if ever, are! 
If, in practice, the same models were used for applicants of color 
as were used for white applicants, those factors not captured by 
the models would have been random. In other words, the dif-
ferences between predicted and actual admission would have 
been approximately equal across the different ethnic/racial 
groups. The statistic of interest was the residual-that is, the 
difference between the proportion actually admitted and the 
proportion predicted to be admitted. The residuals showed that 
for each nonwhite group, the proportion actually admitted was 
substantially larger than the proportion predicted to be admit-
ted. 
There are several points that are relevant to the choice of 
variables to be included in the models used in my study. First, 
the models with LSAT and UGPA as the only variables repro-
duced admission decisions fairly accurately for white applicants. 
These two variables alone accounted for just over 60 percent of 
the variability in admission decisions. Second, these variables 
were examined because they represent the variables that are 
typically of interest to opponents of preferential admission prac-
tices who advocate a "meritocratic" admission practice. Those 
advocates seem to equate test scores and grades with the con-
cept of merit. 14 I have already discussed the need for a broader 
and different definition of merit. 15 The final point related to the 
models is that when other factors typically included in admission 
decisions were added to the model, they did not significantly 
improve the model. The other factors examined were state of 
residency for applicants to state institutions, family economic 
background, selectivity of undergraduate school, and under-
graduate major. None resulted in prediction of actual admission 
decisions that was statistically more accurate than the simple 
LSAT/UGPA model. The estimates of decline in the admission 
of minority students under the two variable models, however, do 
not "assume that eliminating race as a factor amounts to elimi-
nating all other factors except grades and LSAT scores."16 In 
fact, my position throughout the article was exactly opposite to 
that assumption. Specifically, I used the data in the report to 
14. Themstrom, 15 Const. Comm. at 23 (cited in note 2). 
15. See Part II at 45-46. 
16. Themstrom, 15 Const. Comm. at 16 (cited in note 2). 
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demonstrate that although actual admission decisions for appli-
cants of color were larger in number than would have resulted 
from a simple quantitative model, they were not indicative of a 
decision process that admitted applicants simply because they 
were nonwhite. The graduation rate and bar passage data sup-
ported the claim by legal education administrators that law 
schools offer admission only to those applicants of color who are 
qualified to meet the demands of law school academic work.17 
B. KEY QUESTIONS THAT COULD HAVE AND SHOULD HAVE 
BEEN ASKED 
The purpose of a study defines its key questions. The pri-
mary purpose of the study reported in my article was to use em-
pirical data and statistical models to examine the likely impact 
of abandoning considerations of race and ethnicity in the law 
school admission process. An additional goal was to determine 
the consequences of the admission decisions that were made. 
Specifically, were those applicants who would have been denied 
the opportunity of a legal education under an admission process 
that relied only on test scores and undergraduate grades able to 
complete law school and enter the profession? Thus, two basic 
questions were asked: did those students who would have been 
denied access graduate, and did they pass the bar examination? 
In other words, given the opportunity, were they able to acquire 
the knowledge and skills necessary to enter the legal profession? 
Only two criteria are necessary to address these questions: law 
school graduation (i.e., yes or no) and bar passage (i.e., yes or 
no). It is absolutely true that the available data could support 
additional questions. The issue then becomes, for what pur-
pose? If the goal is to deal with the need for and the conse-
quences of considering factors other than test scores and grades 
in making sound admission decisions about applicants from di-
verse and sometimes disadvantaged backgrounds, the two crite-
ria used in my study are sufficient. 
Alternative questions of the form "how well did the minor-
ity students who entered law school in fall 1991 perform while 
there?" were suggested. Comparisons of grades and class rank 
were requested to address these questions. Such evidence could 
help focus on the differences in academic performance between 
and among different groups of students. But what is the purpose 
17. See Leigh H. Taylor, A Faulty and Narrow Understanding of Merit and Quali-
fication in University Admission, Chronicle of Higher Education B3 (Sept. 15, 1995). 
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of asking questions in a form that will maximize differences be-
tween groups such as white students and students of color? Is it 
because there is sincere uncertainty that on average applicants 
with higher test scores and higher grades tend to earn higher 
grades in law school? Surely, there has been no shortage of 
studies of the validity of the LSAT, especially when used in 
combination with UGPA, to support that conclusion. Or, is the 
purpose to move forward a different agenda-an agenda de-
signed to assure that those who have most benefitted from the 
privileges of a majority society continue to be assured those 
privileges? The case has not been made that those students who 
earn the highest first year (or cumulative) grades in law school 
become the most successful members of the profession. Inter-
estingly, despite considerable research effort by the LSAC over 
an extended period of time, there is not a generally acceptable 
definition of success in the profession.18 Not only in law school, 
but in higher education in general, the relationship between 
academic performance and later professional success is weak at 
best, and frequently not established. 
C. EVALUATING AND INTERPRETING THE DATA 
The conclusion from my study that seems to be most at is-
sue is that many minority applicants who would likely have been 
denied a legal education under a color blind admission policy 
were fully capable of meeting the rigors of legal education and 
of entering the profession. The data supported that those stu-
dents earned a degree and passed the bar in substantial num-
bers. The data did not suggest, nor do they need to suggest, that 
students who would have been denied an opportunity for a legal 
education under a numbers-only model caught up to or sur-
passed the law school grades or rank in class of those students 
admitted with the highest scores and grades.19 
Professor Thernstrom called into question several aspects 
of my data comparisons and interpretations. These included 
whether graduation was a sufficiently stringent and meaningful 
criterion, whether differences between black and white gradua-
tion rates weren't more important than differences between the 
two groups of black students (predicted and not predicted to be 
admitted), whether first time pass rates should have been re-
18. See, e.g., Law School Admission Council, Report of LSAC Sponsored Re· 
search: Volume W, 1978·1983 (Law School Admission Services, 1984). 
19. See Part liB (discussing the lack of evidence to support a relationship between 
grades and later success in a profession). 
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ported rather than eventual pass rates, and what the differences 
in eventual pass rates mean. 
Law School Graduation as a Measure of Achievement. Law 
school graduation and bar passage are the achievements that are 
necessary to enter the profession. Evidence of graduation from 
an approved law school, not class rank, is the criterion required 
by the ABA. Law school graduation was dismissed as a meas-
ure of success because the graduation rates were so high (i.e., 
only a relatively small proportion of entering law students failed 
to graduate.) The high graduation rate was attributed to the fact 
that law schools have lowered their standards and engaged in 
social promotion in response to their own affirmative action 
admission practices.20 This is a strong indictment, particularly 
when no evidence to substantiate its validity was provided. 
More importantly, evidence to refute such a claim is available 
from the ABA accreditation standards. Further, it is not sur-
prising that there is a high graduation rate in law schools. The 
number of fall1991 applicants (the cohort included in my study) 
so far exceeded the number of available places that admissions 
were very selective. Even so, the data confirm that admission 
does not assure graduation, particularly when the graduation 
rates of nonwhite students are examined. 
Within Group Comparisons vs. Between Group Compari-
sons. The data that show differences in graduation rates be-
tween white and nonwhite students raise the question about 
whether the lower graduation rates are simply a result of the dif-
ferent admission criteria. For example, the data showed that 
more than 20 percent of black students from the studied cohort 
failed to graduate. The compelling aspect of the data lies in the 
observation that although approximately 22 percent of black law 
students failed to graduate, and although that rate was consid-
erably lower than the graduation rate for white students, the 
difference between white and black graduation rates cannot be 
summarily dismissed as a consequence of differential admission 
practices. The within-group comparisons provide the evidence 
that disproves such a conclusion. Those data support the conclu-
sion that failure to graduate is independent of whether or not a 
student of color would have been admitted based on LSA T 
scores and grades alone. Those data also raise important ques-
tions that were outside the focus of my study on the threat to di-
versity in legal education, but are not outside the issues that 
20. Thernstrom, 15 Const. Comm. at 29-30 (cited in note 2). 
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must be addressed by legal education. For example, if the drop-
out rate is not attributable to special admission practices, then 
what is the explanation? What are the roles and responsibilities 
of educational institutions and educators when dealing with stu-
dents who bring different skills, different needs, and different 
perspectives to the classroom? These questions are for a later 
day, however. 
Eventual Pass Rates or First time Pass Rates? Eventual bar 
passage rates were examined to answer questions about entry to 
the profession. It is true that first time pass rates have been the 
focus of several earlier comparisons between white and non-
white bar exam takers. But it is also true that both educators 
and researchers have questioned the utility of that focus. 21 Inter-
estingly, one reason for the focus on first time pass rates was the 
availability of those data. It is more difficult to accumulate 
eventual pass rate data. More importantly, the issue of the pur-
pose of the question must be raised again. One criticism of re-
porting eventual pass rate was that "some of those she classifies 
as having passed might have done so on their sixth crack at it. If 
the beneficiaries of affirmative action only eke out a passing 
grade after two or three years- with as many as five or six 
tries-it is reasonable to wonder how firm their command of the 
law is. "22 First, there is no basis for concluding that applicants to 
the bar who pass after five or six attempts have less command of 
the law than those who pass after the first or second try. Bar ex-
aminations use blind grading, graders are not aware of the num-
ber of previous attempts, and each decision is independent of 
decisions on previous bar examinations. More importantly, the 
accusation of eking out a passing grade after five or six tries is 
unfounded. In fact, the data reporting number of attempts 
showed exactly one black examinee who did not pass until the 
sixth attempt and two who passed on their fifth try.23 These 
three examinees are exceptions, not descriptive of the pool of 
examinees. For comparison, there were 10 white examinees 
who passed on their fifth try. There was no white examinee who 
21. See, e.g., Edna Wells Handy, Blacks, the Bell Curve, and the Bar Exam, NBA 
Magazine 26 (Mar./ Apr. 19%) (arguing that the importance attached to passing the bar 
on the first try has been unnecessarily inflated); see also Stephen P. Klein, Bar Exami-
nations: Ignoring the Thermometer Does Not Change the Temperature, N.Y. Bar J. 30 
(Oct. 1989) (describing eventual pass rate rather than initial pass rate as the best indica-
tor of access to the profession). 
22. Thernstrom, 15 Const. Comm. at 33 (cited in note 2) (emphasis omitted). 
23. Linda F. Wightman, LSAC National Bar Passage Study, LSAC Research Re-
port (Law School Admission Council, forthcoming). 
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required 6 attempts, although there was one who required 
seven. Among the passing black examinees, 222 required more 
than one attempt. Among those, 69 percent passed on their sec-
ond attempt and 93 percent passed by the third attempt. 
An important distinction, and one that has unfortunately 
been blurred in the lay reporting of the findings, is the compari-
son of pass rates between predicted admission decision groups. 
Both the results and conclusion sections of my report are very 
precise about those outcomes. Specifically, the text states "the 
data show a statistically significant relationship and a small ef-
fect size for Asian American, black, Hispanic, and Puerto Rican 
students, a statistically but not practically significant one for 
white students, but no relationship between the two variables 
for American Indian and Mexican American students. "24 "The 
same data also show that for most, but not all, ethnic groups, 
there is a statistically significant relationship between passing a 
bar examination and predicted admission to law school. "25 
These are important data, and the perspective from which they 
are viewed is also important. First, the data do not find a sig-
nificant relationship between predicted admission and bar pas-
sage within every ethnic group. Second, among those groups 
where the relationship is significant, the effect size-that is, the 
strength of the relationship after it is corrected for sample size-
is of a magnitude that is typically considered a small effect. The 
small effects were of sufficient size to be considered of practical 
significance, not just an artifact of a very large sample size, but 
were not close to the magnitude of an effect that would be con-
sidered a medium effect. On the one hand, these are not differ-
ences about which legal education or the legal profession should 
be complacent. It is a pass rate that is too low when evaluated 
from the perspective of loss of minority law school graduates to 
the profession. Nearly 11 percent of the black examinees in this 
study group failed the first attempt at the bar and never at-
tempted it again. They represent nearly half of those in the 
failed category. These findings identify an area requiring fur-
ther study. Legal educators need to understand why these 
graduates did not return, and use that information as they coun-
sel and prepare future graduates to enter the profession. The 
findings about single attempts also raise questions, however, 
about the utility of bar passage as a criterion in evaluating the 
success of admission decisions. How many of those graduates 
24. Wightman, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 39 (cited in note 1). 
25. Id. at 52. 
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who did not attempt the bar a second time did so because pass-
ing was not necessary to entry or success in their chosen career? 
More importantly there is a positive and encouraging mes-
sage in the data that cannot be ignored. Among those who 
would not have been provided an opportunity under a test-
score-and-grades-based admission model (or a model that pro-
duced similar outcomes) nearly three quarters met the criteria 
for entering the profession. How should we interpret the 
achievements of those students who entered law school with a 
less solid academic background and who persevered and suc-
ceeded? What is the response to those law schools that identi-
fied characteristics of those students that indicated potential de-
spite their lower academic credentials, and then provided the 
education and support to aid them in reaching their potential? 
Should they be chided for taking a risk or applauded for their 
success? Through one lens, the glass is clearly three-quarters 
full and the answers to these questions are straightforward. 
